SECRET GREEN BERET COMMANDOS IN CAMBODIA
A Memorial History of MACV-SOG’s Command and Control Detachment South (CCS), And Its Air Partners, Republic of Vietnam, 1967-1972
by
Book Cover & Preview Text
The book is a history of CCS - the Command and Control South Detachment of MACV-SOG – the Top Secret intelligence-gathering agency for allied forces in the Southeast Asia theatre. CCS deployed reconnaissance teams across Cambodia’s 300-mile border to determine where the North Vietnamese forces (NVA) were gathering or establishing supply bases in Cambodia in violation of the Geneva Agreement of that “neutral” country. SOG recon teams were led by highly qualified US Special Forces men - all volunteers for this most challenging and dangerous type of mission. The covert missions were only for gathering intelligence, however the teams could fight with great firepower for short periods. But enemy contact would have been fatal without our Air Partners, the helicopter gunship support would arrive on scene when enemy contact was made. These teams were quite small – with two or three SF on a six to eight man team. Inserted by helicopters often 15 kilometers from friendly units, when there was contact, they were normally out-numbered by ten or more to one by the enemy. The NVA placed a price on the head of all US SF men captured or killed. None of our men captured were ever acknowledged or released by the enemy at the end of the war. Although this was a critically important mission to the unified MACV command, the use of SOG forces was crippled by Presidential and Pentagon restrictions at the insistence of our weak President Johnson and his US State Department. The corrupt head of the Cambodian government, finally in 1969 admitted the Communist presence in his country, and half-heartedly asked the Reds to leave. With their strength, the NVA violently responded and chased away the weak Cambodian Army from the border area. Shihanouk went on vacation, the people rioted and the government was taken over. Unfortunately, their awakening was too little, too late. President Nixon allowed the Allied Forces to invade Cambodia for only sixty days. Allied forces totally routed the NVA who fled the border area. Allied forces captured tons of documents and netted enough weapons, ammo & food for over 16 month’s of NVA operations; Enough weapons to equip 74 Infantry battalions; the NVA suffered 11,349 killed and 2,328 captured; Allied losses were only1/20th of previous one-year period. Had MACV been allowed to pursue the war, victory was in our grasp. CCS rescued a Cambodian Battalion and its Brigade Headquarters, and stopped the NVA along the Ho Chi Minh trail in NE Cambodia for 62 days, enabling over 2,000 Cambodians to be evacuated and re-equipped and transported back to the Cambodian capitol. Public opinion had forced the president to stop MACV from following up their victorious thrust, and Nixon ordered a scheduled withdrawal of all US combat forces, unfortunately forbidding SOG’s US SF to go back into Cambodia - thus leaving the critical intelligence gathering for that vital area in the hands of the Vietnamese SF. In less than two years, the NVA regrouped with very little opposition inside Cambodia, while the conventional US forces continued their withdrawal. We weren’t beaten, we quit and left our South Vietnamese and Cambodian Army allied to fight on their own. Russia greatly increased their reinforcement of the NVA after it signed the Peace Treaty in Paris on 28 January 1973. The NVA ignored the treaty and completed its conquest of RVN, on April 30, 1975. In spite of the restrictions imposed, SOG accomplished its mission and left a legacy that over time caused the Defense Department to create today’s unified Special Operations Command. SOG’s greatest achievement from its intelligence was saving the lives of so many U.S. and other allied troops. Because of SOG’s effectiveness, Hanoi was compelled to add layers of defensive forces to protect the Ho Chi Minh trail and its bases, eventually committing up to 60,000 troops as rear-area security - against which SOG rarely fielded more than 50 US Special Forces soldiers at any one time across the borders - an economy of force unparalleled in US history. Prohibited from speaking or writing about their missions, the SOG recon troops who averaged 100% wounded, and the supporting ground and air units were finally officially recognized with the Presidential Unit Citation in April 2001.
Formats
Book Details
About the Book
We could call this book “Special Operations Recon Mission Impossible.” A small group of highly trained, resourceful US Special Forces (SF) men is asked to go in teams behind the enemy lines to gather intelligence on the North Vietnamese Army units that had infiltrated through Laos and Cambodia down the Ho Chi Minh trails to their secret bases inside the Cambodian border west of South Vietnam. The covert reconnaissance teams, of only two or three SF men with four or five experienced indigenous mercenaries each, were tasked to go into enemy target areas by foot or helicopter insertion. They could be 15 kilometers beyond any other friendly forces, with no artillery support. In sterile uniforms - with no insignia or identification, if they were killed or captured, their government would deny their military connection. The enemy had placed a price on their heads and had spies in their Top Secret headquarters known as SOG. SOG had three identical recon ground units along the border areas. This book tells the history of Command and Control Detachment South (CCS). The CCS volunteer warriors and its Air Partners – the Army and Air Force helicopter transport and gunship crews who lived and fought together and sometimes died together. This is the first published history of CCS as compiled by its last living commander, some forty years after they were disbanded. It tells of the struggles and intrigue involved in SOG’s development as the modern-day legacy of our modern Special Operations Commands. Forbidden to tell of their experiences for over twenty years; their After Action Reports destroyed even before they were declassified – surviving veterans team together to tell how Recon men wounded averaged 100 percent; and SOG became the most highly decorated unit in Vietnam and all were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.
About the Author
Lieutenant Colonel Lindsey enlisted in the Army in 1948, attaining the rank of Corporal. He was accepted into and graduated from the US Military Academy at West Point in 1954 as a 2nd LT of Infantry. After Infantry School, he qualified as Master Parachutist and as a Ranger. He served in various leadership and staff positions in the 11th Abn Div, the 82nd Abn Div and the 101st Abn Div. In his first Vietnam combat tour, he was MACV G-3 Air Liaison Officer for the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing and flew 50 backseat missions, primarily in F-100s. Then he went to lst Brigade of 101st Abn Div as Asst Ops Officer and then Ops and Exec Officer of the 2/327 Abn Inf Bn. On his second Vietnam tour, he was Cmdr of 2/8th Cav Bn of lst Cav Div. Next he was Deputy Cmdr of OP-35 in MACV-SOG and then was Cmdr of Command and Control Detachment South (CCS) from January - July 1970. He is the last living Cmdr of CCS. His advance schooling included the USMA Preparatory School, a Masters degree at Indiana University, and the Command and General Staff College. He retired after 20 years from the Army in August 1972. His civilian career positions included Exec VP of an architectural and engineering firm; and president of an “Alternative Energy” firm building a Gasohol plant. He served for 12 years in the Indiana Department of Commerce as Program Manager for High Technology Development. His military awards include two Legion of Merit, two Bronze Stars, six Air Medals and the Combat Infantry Badge. Civilian awards are as a Kentucky Colonel and a Sagamore of the Wabash. He is active in local service and veterans’ organizations in Carmel, IN, where he has lived with his family for 38 years.