INTRODUCTION.
The subject of this book, George Digby, has been described as one of the most brilliant minds of his time, a man at the heart of momentous events in the seventeenth century. He played a prominent part in politics, in the Royalist army during the Civil Wars in England, as a member of King Charles II''s entourage in exile and as a courtier after the Restoration. Yet he was a man of extraordinary contrasts. Walpole summed up George’s life as follows: “A singular person, whose life was one contradiction……With great parts, he always hurt himself and his friends; with romantic bravery, he was always an unsuccessful commander.”1
Charming, witty, intelligent, daring and brave, he attracted crowned monarchs, statesmen and great soldiers, who all bestowed patronage upon him. He made and then squandered a fortune several times over. At the same time he managed to infuriate colleagues and enemies alike. Close to the throne, with the persuasive powers to make his influence felt, he achieved much less than many of his contemporaries who were in less fortunate positions. A one-time close friend of one of the intellectual giants of the age, Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, George was ultimately the chief architect of that great man''s downfall and exile. Always fascinating, he was seldom still, forever dreaming up bright ideas, then dropping them as suddenly as he had thought of them.
History has been unkind to George Digby. Edward Hyde, who had been a close friend in his youth, became his bitterest enemy in his latter years, and wrote critically of him in his memoirs, and in his famous “History of the Rebellion.” Hyde’s judgement is frequently accepted as the standard, yet it must be seen in the context of his animosity towards George arising from attempts to have him impeached for treason. Hyde wrote his major works late in life after having been exiled, so his opinion of George was coloured by the bitterness between them. He had, in earlier times, been full of admiration for George, and a staunch political ally. Hyde was a man of intense prejudices who became cantakerous and out of sorts with society and his contemporaries in later life; George was not the only prominent courtier to suffer severe criticism from him. Even Prince Rupert, the king’s nephew, was represented as “little more than a swashbuckling troublemaker, invariably in the wrong in every dispute that arose.”2
George reached his highest position at court during the first English Civil War, when he was Secretary of State to King Charles I. Both as a soldier and then as a close adviser to the king, he was in the thick of the action throughout the war. Many of the Royalists’ failings during that Civil War have been laid at George’s door. His conflict with the hero Prince Rupert, who commanded the Royalist army, has frequently been remarked upon as a chief cause of Royalist failings. George has been criticised as an incompetent general, a poor strategist and an unrealistic adviser, as opposed to the dashing prince, who impressed everyone with his bravery and panache on the battlefield. The charge of unrealistic optimism against George relates to the latter stages of the war, when he can be seen telling everyone that the Royalists are close to victory, and that everything will be all right. Yet correspondence shows that he was, in truth, fully aware of the king’s plight, and pessimistic about the outcome of the war. It can be argued that at a time when many of those closest to King Charles accepted defeat, including Rupert, George’s was a lone voice sustaining the Royalist war effort.
It must also be remembered that at the start of the war, George had no military experience whatsoever: he learnt as he went along. Yet time and again he was praised by seasoned soldiers for his courage and willingness to lead. In the years that followed he could point to several significant victories. By the end of the war his opinion, which was influential, can be argued to have much merit. At critical points in the war, if some of his more visionary ideas had been followed, the outcome of the war may have been different and it will be one of the objectives of this book to examine these questions.
Less frequently has Rupert’s performance been critically examined. Rupert’s impulsiveness, his impatience and rudeness towards colleagues, led to rifts which could have been avoided. He was no diplomat, and made no attempt to win colleagues to his point of view. He was a professional soldier, and saw the war in terms of conflict to conclusion. Brought up in Continental Europe, his early military experience there led him to adopt harsh and mercenary tactics when laying siege to towns, creating resentment and antagonism